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Abstract
EPR-like phenomena are (presumably) indeterministic, but they further-
more suggest that our world involves seeming-strange “funny business.”
 
Without invoking any heavy mathematics, the theory of branching space-
times offers two apparently quite different ways in which EPR-like funny
business goes beyond simple indeterminism. (1) The first is a modal ver-
sion of a Bell-like correlation: There exist two space-like separated indeter-
ministic initial events whose families of outcomes are nevertheless modally
correlated. That is, although the occurrence of each outcome of each of the
two space-like separated initial events is separately possible, some joint oc-
currence of their outcomes (one from each) is impossible. (2) The second
sounds like superluminal causation: A certain initial event can bear a cause-
like relation to a certain outcome event without being in the causal past of that
outcome. The two accounts of EPR-like funny business are proved equiva-
lent, a result that supports the claim of each as useful to mark the line between
mere indeterminism and EPR-like funny business.

This is a “postprint” based on the version published in Non-locality and modality, eds. T. Placek
and J. Butterfield, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 2002, pp. 293–315. The archive at
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu contains two recent related articles by the author,
“No-common-cause EPR-like funny business in branching space-times” (2002) and “A theory of cau-
sation: causae causantes (originating causes) as inus conditions in branching space-times” (2002).
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1 Determinism, indeterminism, funny business
The language of branching space-times1 as it is spelled out in Belnap 1992 is aus-
tere, concerning as it does only the causal ordering on possible point events of our
world2 and without any mention of probabilities.3 By refraining from invoking the
rich language needed for anything like a quantum-mechanical account, this very
austerity appears to permit a sharp and simple delineation of three ways our world
might be.
1. It might be strictly and universally deterministic: Given any initial event, its
outcome is uniquely determined, which is to say, there is only one possible
outcome.
2. It might be indeterministic, so that some initial events face multiple incom-
patible possibilities for their futures; but without any features that are EPR-
like. (It was plausible to think of radium decay like that.)
3. It might be (and indeed seems to be) not only indeterministic, but exhibiting
EPR-like “funny business,” as I will say.4
The aim of this study is to add to our understanding of these distinctions, and espe-
cially to help with the much-too-fuzzy idea of “EPR-like funny business.” Contri-
1Note the profound difference between “branching space-times” on the one hand and so-called
“branching time” on the other. “Branching time,” with “time” in the singular, is not, incidentally,
good terminology, since there is no reason not to let “time” connote a linear order. The phrase is,
however, fixed in a large literature, and to try to use another would be quixotic. On the other hand,
“branching space-time,” as in the title of BST-92, is little used, so that it seems reasonable to try
to replace it, as I do here, with the less misleading plural phrase “branching space-times.” This
usage recognizes the intention that the branching be between space-times. Both branching time and
branching space-times place a causal order on concrete “events,” but in branching time, the terms of
the causal order are giant Laplacean “simultaneity slices,” not tiny little point events. Branching time
can be used to represent a global version of indeterminism, but not—in the absence of additional
vocabulary—seriously local indeterminism such as can be represented when one puts a causal order
on point events. Chapters 6, 7, and 8 of Belnap, Perloff and Xu 2001 contain some foundational
discussions pertaining to indeterminism as it is represented in “branching time” theory, including a
sustained argument against employing the idea of an “actual future” in thinking about indeterminism,
and a careful account of how one living in an indeterminist world must use the future tense. These
discussions remain relevant when the switch is made to branching space-times.
2For instance, no language of “systems,” “states,” “particles,” “laws,” or “theories.”
3Perhaps more thinkers than not claim to understand probability while finding possibility mys-
terious. You cannot, however, have probability without possibility. If you want to be technical,
possibility lies in the so-called “probability space,” an understanding of which seems essential to any
adequate understanding of applied probability.
4Adding probabilistic language permits consideration of a concept of Bell-like funny business;
but that is not our topic.
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butions to this end can come from many quarters, historical, theoretical, experimen-
tal, metaphorical, etc.5 My working hypothesis is that there can be complementary
benefit by seeing what can be done within the “pre-physical” and even pre-metric
language of branching space-times (BST-926) whose only primitives are (1) the no-
tion of point event and (2) a causal order on them in terms of which one can define
ideas and relations that illuminate both indeterminism and space-time. The thought
is that staying within the confines of what is there called “branching space-times”
encourages one to try to make the three-fold distinction between determinism, in-
determinism, and EPR-like funny business in a fashion that is sharp (absolutely
rigorous), simple (only two uncomplicated primitives; no heavy mathematics), and
intuitive (which is of course a subjective matter).
Trying, however, is not succeeding: I’ll first go over some suggestions that are
at best only partially successful. (There are obvious cases of such funny business
that do not fall under those versions.) The aim of this study to give accounts that
may or may not be “final,” but are anyhow better than those that I initially survey.
I give two that one may hope are satisfactory:
  Generalized primary space-like-related modal-correlation funny business
  Some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny business.
Each, which is rigorously defined in terms of the primitives of BST-92 theory,
is intended to express a fundamental feature of one aspect (only) of quantum-
mechanical wonderment.7 These two ideas are proven to be in a certain sense
equivalent, which I offer as evidence of their stability and suitability to their pur-
pose. What purpose? I suggest that BST-92 theory, though “pre-physical”8 rather
than “physical,” is a seriously helpful guide to broad-gauge physical understand-
ing that goes beyond mere metaphor or arm-waving about the indeterminist and
funny-business aspects of our world.
I begin with a hurried review of some fundamental definitions, postulates, and
facts. Then I develop the two ideas of “funny business,” and finally prove the
supporting equivalence.
5In addition to offering his own approach, Placek 2000 provides valuable access to a rich variety
of different such contributions.
6
“BST-92” refers to the particular way in which the idea of branching space-times is worked out
in Belnap 1992. The branching space-times theories of McCall 1994 and Placek 2000 share much
of the underlying motivation of BST-92, but differ in key ways with respect to primitives, postulates,
and definitions. Rakic´ 1997 puts the BST-92 version into a useful perspective.
7The language of BST-92 is not known to permit, for example, a representation of something as
basic as the quantized nature of quantum-mechanical concepts; but since it does not pretend to do so,
this is hardly a defect.
8A physicist after hearing a lecture once indicated impatience with the ideas of BST-92 by label-
ing them “common sense.” Would that it were so.
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2 Ancillary ideas of branching space-times
The BST-92 idealization of the causal structure of our world invokes just two prim-
itives: the set of all possible point events (each taken to be as fully concrete as any
point event in our actual past), which I call Our World (OW for short), and the
causal order on them,   . Define  in the usual way by 	    & 
  .
Then 
 may be read indifferently either as “  is in the causal past of  ” or
“  is among the future of possibilities of  .”
2.1 Postulates and basic definitions
All but one of the postulates of BST-92 are standard order-theoretic postulates. As
can be seen from BST-92, however, each plays a definite role in giving an account
of how histories branch from each other (indeterminism); none is given for its mere
space-time content. That is why there are so few, as follows.
  OW is a nonempty set; its members are called point events, written  and
sometimes  .   is a partial order on OW (reflexive, transitive, antisymmet-
ric). There are no maximal elements (  OW  [ 
 &  OW]).
 is dense in OW ( 	 [ 
 ]). A chain  is defined as
a connected subset of OW (  , ff ( 
    or    
 ).
  An outcome chain, written fi , is a nonempty lower bounded chain, and each
outcome chain fi has an infimum, written flffi "!#fi%$ .
  A history, written & , is a subset of OW that is maximal with respect to con-
taining an upper bound for each pair of its members.9 Facts: Every point
event is a member of (and every chain is a subset of) some history (by Zorn’s
lemma); each history is closed downward; and no history has a member that
is maximal in that history.
  An initial chain, written ' , is a nonempty and upper bounded chain, and
each initial chain ' has a supremum in each history & of which it is a subset,
written (*),+.-!/'$ .
  Two histories & and & separate (or divide or split) at a point event  , written
&0132& , 465879 is maximal in &;:3& .
9Each history may usefully—but optionally—be pictured as a Minkowski space-time. It is to our
purpose in clarifying indeterminism and funny business, however, that there be not nearly enough
postulates to force that interpretation.
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A point event 	 prior to (or identical with)  belongs equally to both histories;
relative to that earlier point event  , both future historical courses are equally
possible. After  , however, no matter what happens next, at least one of &" and &
can only be termed “was possible but isn’t anymore.” Splitting at a point event is
extended to sets of histories in a natural fashion, as follows. (Here and below we let

 fi46587 
 for all ,%fi , and we let '  and '  fi take on analogous
universal meanings.)
 
&01
2

46587 the one point event  works for every member of  ( & ;132&
for every &   ). And  1 2   465879&0;1 2   for every &    .
The idea of separating or splitting is required for the final postulate that I use in
this study:10
  The prior choice postulate. .fi&.& [( fi is an outcome chain and fi
( &09& ))   [ % fi and &;132& ]]. Choosing fi = 
	 (that is, fi = 
	 )
is an important special case.
The prior choice postulate says that if we are in the middle of some outcome event
fi that belongs to a history &. , but we are not located within a specific complete
history &  , then there is in the past of fi a definite locus  in Our World such
that what happened at  kept &. possible at the expense of making &0 no longer
possible. If we take a “world line” back from where we are in fi (that line will
lie entirely within &. ), then  is exactly where our “world line” leaves & . Before
 both &0 and & were possible courses of events for the future, but  , which is
known to lie in the past of fi , is the exact point event at which a “choice” was
made that kept & possible at the expense of rendering &0 no longer possible.11
2.2 Definitions: Propositions and their truth, events and their occur-
rence
BST-92 permits a tightly organized and intuitively sensible theory of propositions
to the effect that such and such an event “occurs.”
10It must be added that in connection with a theory of how probabilities work in branching space-
times, M. Wiener discovered the necessity of an additional postulate to the effect that given two
initial chains and two histories, the order of the respective suprema is preserved as the histories are
varied. The consequences of this postulate are not used here.
11Choice? All there is to say in the language of BST-92 is that up to and including  both his-
tories remained possible futures, but immediately after  (and indeed forever after  ) that was no
longer true. Perhaps this is also a place to remark that my use of tensed constructions is wholly
unobjectionable, but makes sense only if one pictures oneself somewhere within Our World, for ex-
ample, somewhere in  . One can of course retail the same causal facts tenselessly. See Chapters 6
and 8 of Belnap et al. 2001 for a careful working out of how tenses must be used in the context of
indeterminism.
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  In the spirit of possible-worlds theory, a proposition is a set of histories  ;
and  is said to be true in each of its members.
 
  
2 = & :   &  (the proposition that  occurs);   = & : '  &  (the
proposition that ' , considered as an initial event, occurs in the sense that it
finishes or (fully) passes away). 
	 = & : fiff:3&   (the proposition
that fi , considered as an outcome event, occurs in the sense that it begins or
comes to be).12
BST-92 permits consistency concepts that are both rigorous and natural. The
reason for this is its controlled treatment of the relation between events and propositions—
consistency is prima facie understandable only for propositions, but BST-92 can
then piggy-back consistency for events on propositional consistency.
 
 is consistent (inconsistent) 4 587  is nonempty (empty).   is consis-
tent (inconsistent) with   46587  :   is consistent (inconsistent). More
generally, propositions forming a set  are jointly consistent 4 587

.
Consistency (inconsistency) in application to point events or sets of point events
is always mediated via appropriate sets of histories standing for occurrence propo-
sitions. The postulates readily guarantee that ' and fi are each consistent (every
nonempty chain can be extended to a history so that   and  	 are certain to
be nonempty), so until Sections 4.2 and 4.4 invoke more complex notions of initial
and outcome respectively, we only need to attend to joint consistency of events:
  Two or more events each considered in a certain way (i.e., each considered
either as initial or as outcome) are (jointly) consistent 4 587 their occurrence-
propositions are so. Important example:  is consistent with , iff    2   :
  
2

 ; which is to say, iff & [  & &  & ].
2.3 Definitions and facts: transitions and spreads
In order to put the matter of funny business in the clearest possible light, I first
develop the notions of “transition” and “spread,” which come from Szabo and
12There are good things to mean by “proposition” other than the given timeless sense, and other
good ways to use “occurs.” The current definitions are offered nonexclusively, as useful in their own
right. I note that if one wishes to indulge in a tensed usage of “occur” that is both carefully controlled
by theory and also easy to understand, it would appear to be better to insert a past tense: a certain
initial or outcome event “occurred”; or, if reference to the future is wanted, “will have occurred.”
(Note 1 above cites a careful discussion of how the future tense must be understood in the context of
indeterminism.)
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Belnap 1996. This development is alas a bit tedious, but it is hard to be clear
about the ideas without it.
  A chain transition is defined as an ordered pair of an initial chain ' (or a sin-
gle point event  ) and an outcome chain fi , where '  fi . I write '  fi .
Such a transition in Our World is intended in the spirit of Russell’s “at-at”
account of motion. A good deal of the “mystery” of indeterminism can be
attributed to the neglect of the theory of transitions.13 See Belnap 1999 and
Xu 1997 for further discussions.
  A chain spread is defined as an ordered pair of an initial chain ' and a set

of outcome chains such that (1) the pairing of ' with each fi   is a chain
transition, and (2) exactly one member of  occurs in any history in which
' occurs. I write ' 

. A spread is our theoretical stand-in for any local
indeterministic situation such as a quantum-mechanical “measurement” or
a choice by an investigator.
Szabo and Belnap 1996 considered transitions '  fi such that the outcome
chain fi begins in the perhaps distant future of the finishing of the initial chain '  .
From the present perspective, the critical feature of such a transition is that there is
time-like room between '	 and fi . Such room permits the possibility that there be
an “influence” from an outside initial ' represented by the fact that a “world line”
can run from ' up to fi . I bring this up only to contrast it with the present targets,
which are certain immediate transitions and spreads.
 
'  fi is an immediate chain transition 4587 '  fi is a chain transition such
that there is no point event  such that '   and   fi .
 
' 

is an immediate chain spread 4 587 ' 

is a chain spread such that
'  fi is an immediate chain transition for each fi 

.
Because of denseness, given any immediate chain transition '  fi , either '
has a last member  and fi is downward nonterminating with flffi "!#fi%$ =  , or fi has
a first member  and ' is upward nonterminating with (*),+"-!/'$ =  for some &9
 
. For all our particular analytic purposes, we can think of the former as having
the form   fi (with flffi "!#fi%$ =  ) and the latter as having the form '   (with
(*),+-!/'$ =  for appropriate & ).14
13For instance, “when” is a transition? It has, in Whitehead’s phrase, no “simple location,” and to
speak as if it did may (but of course need not) invite confusion.
14That is, I feel free here and elsewhere to neglect the distinction between a unit set and its member.
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Both are important, but they are profoundly different in their causal properties.
A transition of the type   fi is a simple and apt candidate for a causa causans or
“originating cause” for the following reason. Consider   fi . Suppose you think
that some initial ' in the causal past of fi that is separate and independent of  can
be the initial of a spread that “influences” the occurrence of fi . But then, because
flffi "!#fi%$ =  , any “line of influence” from ' to fi will need to pass through  , and so
not after all be separate and independent. Given that   fi is immediate, there is
no “room for outside influences from the past.”15 In other words, if you are looking
for a place in Our World such that what happens there is relevant to the transition
from  to fi , you cannot find any such place in the past of fi except for  itself.
In contrast, in spite of the immediacy of '    , some initial ' may well “in-
fluence” the occurrence of  : There is still room for a “line of influence” or a
“world line” to run up from ', up to  without passing through '	 . It is for this rea-
son that transitions '	   are best taken as more similar in their causal character
to non-immediate transitions than they are to transitions of the form   fi . It is
only in the latter case that all routes from initials in the proper past of fi up to fi
are forced to pass through  .
I call a transition of type   fi “primary” in order to emphasize its theoretical
role as a causa causans.
 
  fi is a primary chain transition 4 5873  fi is an immediate chain tran-
sition whose initial is a single point event.16
  Fact:   fi is a primary chain transition iff   fi and flffi "!#fi%$   .
 
 

is a primary chain spread 4 587% 

is an immediate chain spread
whose initial is a single point event.
  Fact: If  

is a primary chain spread, then for each &9    2 there is
exactly one fi 

such that &9 
	
. In other words,   	 : fi 

 is
a partition of 
 
2 . In fact,  
	
: fi 

 is uniquely determined as  2 ,
defined below.
It is often awkward or circuitous to speak of immediate outcomes of  as
chains, for outcomes naturally lead a double life as events and as propositions. It
is intuitive to say that when   fi is an immediate transition, so is   	 . But
what is “immediate” about a propositional outcome (set of histories)? Of course
we wish 	 to be one, but what is the species? BST-92 suggests the following.
15This reasoning is given with shudder-quotes in the absence of a proper theory of “influence.”
16A primary chain transition   can be vacuous:  	 = 
  . Even though in that case 
 is hardly of much use as a causa causans, this won’t get in our way.
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Consider any collection of histories all containing  . If any two of them &" and &
contain a point event that is in the proper future of  , then any split between them
must occur after  . At  the histories &  and & are “undivided,” and must remain
so for some stretch after  . Therefore, since they do not divide until later, so as far
as immediate outcomes of  go, &. and & must stay together as part of the same
immediate outcome.
This line of thought (which the article BST-92 suggests as the heart of its ac-
count) leads to the following definitions and facts.
 
&0 and & are undivided at  , written &.  2 & , 46587   &0;:3& but  is not
maximal in &;:3& .
Being undivided at  , &.   2 & , and being separated at  , &.;132& , both
imply that  belongs to &.;:3& , but given that presupposition alone, being-
undivided-at and being-separated-at must have opposite truth values.
  Fact: The relation &   2 & of undividedness is, given the postulates of BST-
92, transitive: the “transitivity of undividedness.” See BST-92 for a proof,
which turns out to require nearly all of the postulates. Undividedness at  is
therefore an equivalence relation on 
  2 since it is easily seen to be reflexive
on
  
2 (proof in BST-92) and symmetric (no proof needed).
Because it is an equivalence relation, undividedness at  gives us a smooth theory
of primary propositional outcomes, transitions, and spreads.
 
 is a primary propositional outcome of 345873&0 [ &0   and & [ &0   2
& 4 & 
 ]].
 

2

587 the set of primary propositional outcomes of  .  2 is a partition of
  
2 .
 

2

& (for   & )  587 the member of  2 to which & belongs.  2  & (for  
& ) is a primary propositional outcome of  , and every primary propositional
outcome of  can be expressed in the form  2

& for some &9 
 
2 .
 
 
 is a primary propositional transition 4587  is a primary proposi-
tional outcome of  .
 
   is a primary propositional spread 4587 is the set of all primary
propositional outcomes of  ; which is to say, iff  =  2 .
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  So    2 is a primary propositional spread. The “spread” terminology is
justified since exactly one member of  2 is true in each history in which 
occurs.17
Finally, having introduced two kinds of primary transitions and spreads (chain
and propositional), one may observe that there is a smooth passage in each direc-
tion.
  If   fi is a primary chain transition, then 
	
is a primary propositional
outcome of  , so that   
	
is a primary propositional transition.
  Conversely, if  is a primary propositional outcome of  , so that    is
a primary propositional transition, then there is an fi such that  = 
	
and   fi is a primary chain transition.
  Adding a little more detail, given   & , there is always an outcome chain fi
such that   fi and fi  & and flffi "!#fi%$ =  . In other words, if   & , there
is a primary chain transition   fi such that fi  &  Furthermore, when the
latter three conditions hold,  	 =  2

& .
  If  

is a primary chain spread then  2 =   	 : fi 

 .
  Conversely, given a primary propositional spread    2 , there is a set

of
outcome chains such that    2 =    
	
: fi 

 .
These natural moves between the chain and propositional ideas of primary tran-
sition and spread, having been concentrated here, will be made without comment.
The beginning of this section introduced general ideas of chain transitions and
spreads, but as yet we haven’t made room for the general ideas of propositional
transitions and spreads.
 
' 
 is a chain-proposition transition 4587   
 
. When the subset
relation is proper, the transition is contingent.
 
'   is a chain-proposition spread 4 587  is a partition of    .
These last ideas are perhaps too general to be of much service, and they are used
here just a little. Observe that even this very abstract idea of “spread” insists on
some sort of location in branching space-times via the location of ' .18
17Since the matter is not as memorable as one might have hoped, I call attention to the fact that
with respect to a certain history, our jargon allows that an event occurs or not, whereas a proposition
is true or not.
18There is room left for “proposition-proposition” transitions and spreads, but I know of no par-
ticular application for them.
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3 Generalized primary space-like-related modal-correlation
funny business
What is a “modal correlation,” and when does it constitute EPR-like “funny busi-
ness”? If you have two spreads each with its own set of possible outcomes, then
“correlation” means that knowing what happens at one of them gives you some
information about what happens at the other.19 In a “modal correlation,” the infor-
mation is in terms of consistency and inconsistency.
We can get the right definition of “modal correlation” by paying attention to
the most general case. Suppose we have two chain-proposition spreads ';    
and '    ff .
 
'    and '    ff are modally correlated 4 587  :   =  for some

    and    ff .20
  If we specify both the two spreads and an inconsistent pair of outcomes (one
from each), we say that we have a modal correlation.
It is built into the notation (and the “given” clauses) that the outcome   of
the first transition and the outcome   of the second are each possible. Each is
individually possible. The question is, can both   and   be true in some one
history? Modal correlation says No. Absence of modal correlation says Yes. (Per-
mit me to emphasize that this analysis absolutely requires that what is correlated
are spreads; no vague notion of “variable” will serve.)
3.1 Simplest kind of space-like-related modal-correlation funny busi-
ness
Whether modal or probabilistic, correlation between spreads ';    and '   
ff is, as such, uninteresting; it happens too often. It seems part of the literature
concerning various quantum-mechanical “entanglement” phenomena such as EPR
that a key feature of the interesting (surprising?) cases is that the correlation oc-
curs between space-like related measurements. If one for the moment idealizes
a measurement as a primary spread, a suggestive kind of a priori deduction of the
relevance of space-like relatedness becomes possible. To see this, let us first give
the definition of “space-like related” from BST-92.
  Two point events 	 and  are space-like related, written  SLR  , 46587
they are (1) consistent, (2)   , and (3) both 	  and 
  .
19The epistemic language is of course only for expository convenience.
20Modal correlation is a stronger property than probabilistic correlation. Contrariwise, absence of
modal correlation means much less than absence of probabilistic correlation.
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This definition of “space-like related” is the same as that of Minkowski space-
time, with one addition required by BST-92: There must be at least one history that
contains both point events. They cannot be inconsistent.
It is “scientifically natural” to find interest in a case of two primary spreads at
space-like remove that are nonetheless correlated, and the upcoming “deduction”
does not touch on the sufficiency of being space-like related for being interesting.
Rather, I show that if the initials of two primary spreads are not space-like related,
then there is no interest in their modal correlation.
Consider then two primary spreads     2  and     2 . There are three
ways (1)–(3) in which their initials can fail to be space-like related. In each of these
cases, I indicate why the question of modal correlation is obviously uninteresting.
1. If the initials 	 and  are inconsistent, there is inevitable and indeed ram-
pant modal correlation, since every member of every     2  must con-
tain 
 , whereas in virtue of the inconsistency of  and  , no member of
any

 

2 can contain 	 . So in this case, modal correlation is trivially
inescapable. Since the existence of inconsistent pairs of point events is a
consequence of the merest hint of even straightforward no-funny-business
indeterminism (that is, it follows from the bare existence of more than one
history), such modal correlations do not by themselves warrant our interest.
2. When 	 =  , then intuitively we might not speak of “correlation.” But it is
illuminating to see that in BST-92, if  =  then we can give reasons of a
sort: There are two equally uninteresting cases. Case (a). If  2  (which is
the same as  2 ) has more than one member, say  0   , then of course
you are going to find a modal correlation. Since ;   2  =     2 is
a spread, its distinct outcome propositions have empty intersection:  :  
=

, and modal correlation cannot be avoided. Case (b). On the other hand,
if  2  is trivial (has just one member, namely,    2   ), then the absence of
modal correlation is vacuous and of equal lack of interest.
3. If 
 is in the causal past of  , then according to BST-92 theory,21 the very
occurrence of , is consistent with one and only one primary outcome of ;
(member of  2  ). Two cases. Case (a). Perhaps  has    2   as its single
vacuous primary outcome. This is evidently a case of uninteresting absence
of modal correlation. Case (b).  has more than one primary outcome. We
know that , is consistent with only one of them, so that each of the other
outcomes of 	 is inconsistent with any and every outcome of 
 ; which is
equally uninteresting. So if  , “modal correlation” is in either case
21The transitivity of undividedness is involved.
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uninteresting. And, of course, the case is the same if 	 lies in the causal
past of 	 .
What happens when one eliminates these three uninteresting cases? In BST-
92 that is exactly to say that  and  are “space-like related”: Modal correlation
between primary spreads     2  and     2 is interesting only if  is space-
like related to , . In my view such correlations are interesting in exactly the way
that EPR-like phenomena are, which is why I call such modal correlations a kind of
“funny business,” an opinion built into the wording of the following definiendum.
  Two primary spreads     2  and     2 are space-like-related modally
correlated 4 5879
 SLR  and for some & and & such that 	 &0 and 
& ,

2


&0 
:

2

&  =

  Two primary spreads     2  and     2 taken together with two outcome-
determining histories &. and & constitute a case of space-like-related modal-
correlation funny business of the simplest kind 4 587
– 
 SLR  and
– 
  &0 and  & and
–

2


&0 	:

2

&  =

.
22
Figure 1: BST-92 picture of Einstein-Rosen-Podolski.
22Two comments. (1) The phrase “outcome-determining” is redundant. It is intended to highlight
the role of the histories in defining a particular modal correlation; namely, the histories serve only to
determine which two outcomes are inconsistent. (2) The passage from “inconsistent” to “not space-
like related” is valid only for the present case, where the initials are single point events, but fails
when later we consider initials that are sets of point events. Then two initials in the more general
sense can be (according to the definitions we give) both space-like related and inconsistent.
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Simplest cases of SLR modal-correlation funny business are EPR-like. The
BST-92 picture of EPR is given in Figure 1.23 EPR is overkill for SLR modal
correlation in two ways. (1) Not only are  and  consistent, but they occur in
exactly the same histories. (2) There is more than one joint outcome that is im-
possible: Both  2 

&0 
:

2

&  =
 and  2 

& 	:

2

&0  =

. Informally we
can say this by the following: If you are sitting immediately after   , then you
are sure to know exactly what you will find out has happened at  , namely, the
opposite sign. To see how EPR itself goes beyond the weakest sort of SLR modal
correlation, look at Figure 2. Here, sitting just after ; , if you see that a “  ” has
happened, then you know which outcome of 
 you will eventually find in your
past; but if you see that a “   ” has happened, then you know nothing (yet) about
which outcome of , you will eventually find in your past. That is because there is
only a single modal correlation.24 I still suggest that this is “essentially” the same,
however, as the EPR case. What is “essential” is that there be at least one modal
correlation (impossible joint outcome).
If two primary transitions     2  and     2 are SLR modally correlated
according to definition, it follows that at least one of  2  and  2 is nontrivial,
which is to say, its initial does not predetermine an outcome.25 One of 
    2 
and     2 might by the definition be a trivial spread, but let us put this aside:
Assume that both are nontrivial. Then the situation is this: Although the primary
spreads originating in  and  are space-like separated, and although in each
case there is no predetermination of which outcome comes to be, it is nevertheless
23BST-92 is about many space-times branching. To picture this is not so easy, and to explain the
pictures is even more difficult. The convention is that a figure represents each history in Our World
with a separate two-dimensional Minkowski diagram. Identically labeled point events are identical,
each typically belonging to more than one history. If the regions immediately after a labeled point
event are marked the same in two histories (for example, in Figure 2, “  ” after   in each of  
and   ) then those histories are undivided there, and contain exactly the same points there. On the
other hand, if in two histories the regions immediately after one and the same point event are marked
differently (for example, in Figure 2, after   there is “  ” in   and “  ” in  ), the convention is
that the labeled point event is a “choice point”: The two histories split at that point event, so that
after the choice point, no point events—not even those on light-like paths emanating from the choice
point—are common to the two histories. A further “negative” convention is that using the same mark
for the immediate future of distinct labeled point events (for example, in Figure 2, “  ” after both

 and   in   ) has no strictly causal meaning. When worrying about indeterminism and funny
business according to BST-92, “similarity” doesn’t count.
24It seems to me certain that anyone who is sufficiently familiar with quantum mechanics should
be able to rig up an experimental situation having the causal shape described in Figure 2; that is part
of what I intend by suggesting that BST-92 can serve as a sort of guide to finding one’s way around
amid scary physics. I myself cannot give you a concrete example, however, because I fail the test of
familiarity.
25If two primary transitions are each trivial, they have one and only one joint outcome, which, if
they are space-like-related, must certainly be consistent and hence not a modal correlation.
 
	  	
Printed September 3, 2002
3. Generalized primary space-like-related modal-correlation funny business 15
Figure 2: Space-like-related modal correlation of the simplest kind.
guaranteed in advance that a certain combination of outcomes will not happen.26
This is a type of EPR-like “funny business” abstractly described. I intend this as
kind of a claim: If you yourself come across a concrete pair of measurement-like
situations for which this idealization seems apt, then you yourself will find that
you have found something that belongs in the EPR family with regard to its causal
structure.
One should reject the converse: There are kinds of funny business that are not
space-like-related modal correlations of the simplest kind. Each of Figure 3 and
Figure 4 is an illustration of funny business that does not, however, exhibit SLR
modal correlation of the simplest kind. Look at Figure 3. There is no SLR modal
correlation of the simplest kind. If you want a modal-correlation account of this
funny business that is like the simplest kind in its concentration on single-point-
event initials, you have to divide into three space-like separated initials rather than
just two. You will find that each of these three initials has its own outcomes, but
that there is a combination of one outcome from each that is impossible (namely,
the       combination).
3.2 Primary space-like related modal correlation generalized
There is, however, a way to keep our primary SLR modal-correlation account bi-
nary and still have it apply to this case, and this is the way that we take.27 Let
one initial consist of two point events instead of just one; namely, let the initials be
defined as sets of point events that are consistent in the way that an initial should
be:
26In pictures this looks like “missing histories.” Thinking in this way with your right brain is fine
as long as it does not lead you to decide that funny business is abnormal.
27Szabo and Belnap 1996 works with SLR correlations that are neither binary nor primary. Note
that here I am not trying to use “intuition” in order to show up Figure 3 as exhibiting funny business;
I have already done that. Now the task is to see how to modify a binary account in order to apply to
this case.
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 
 
is an initial event 4 587    and & [    & ].28
Let
 
range over arbitrary initial events:   is always a nonempty set of point events
that is consistent in the sense that they occur together in at least one history. Let   
= 
  in Figure 3, and let    =  ,  . Evidently  

&  =

2


&  = & , & ,
&  , by our prior definitions. We need, however, to figure out what to mean by 
when the initial   is more than a single point event. A tactic that plays out well in
the present context is to define a “generalized primary propositional outcome” of
an initial event via quantified undividedness.29
Figure 3: A piece of funny business with seven histories.
  For any initial event   , &. is undivided from &  at   , written &    & , 46587
&0 
2
& for every     ; the relation is evidently an equivalence relation on




.
 
 is an generalized primary propositional outcome of   4 587 for some &



,

= & : &0  

& .
 


587 the set of generalized primary propositional outcomes of   ;  is
a partition of 



.
  For
 
 &0 ,


&0 

587 & : &0  

& , and is the generalized primary propo-
sitional outcome of   to which &. belongs.
  Where   is an initial,      is a generalized primary propositional transition
46587



; and a generalized primary propositional spread is defined as
a spread having the form      .
28We defined an initial chain as requiring an upper bound, which is indeed a necessary condition of
having a supremum. In the present investigation, however, the upper-bound requirement has seemed
unnecessary in connection with using the more general notion of an initial event.
29The double-orthocomplement idea as employed in Placek 2000 (p. 143) should not be neglected.
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  Let “GP” stand for “generalized primary.”
With these definitions,  

&   = &   in Figure 3 is a GP propositional outcome
of   ; and evidently we have a modal correlation:



& 	:



&   =

.
Further, and this is an essential observation, each member of    is space-like re-
lated to each member of    , so that we have not just any modal correlation; we have
a space-like-related modal correlation. Let us convert this observation to a defini-
tion.
 
 
 SLR
 
 465879
 SLR  for every 	    and     .
That is, to say of two initial events that they are space-like related is to say that
each member of one is space-like related to each member of the other.30
Now that all concepts are sharply defined, we can enlarge the account of SLR
modal correlation:
  Two GP propositional spreads       and        are space-like-related
modally correlated 4 587    SLR    and for some & and & such that     &0
and     & ,  

&0 	:



&  =

.
It is easy to see that the funny business illustrated in Figure 3 falls under this
account, so that it no longer stands as a counterexample to the thesis that all sit-
uations exhibiting EPR-like funny business fall under the rubric of “SLR modal
correlation” as defined in the language of BST-92. SLR modal correlation of the
simplest kind may not be enough, but it is worth conjecturing that the more general-
ized notion is indeed “enough.” I express this conjecture by means of the following
definition.
  Two GP propositional spreads        and        together with two
outcome-determining histories &  and & such that     &0 and     & con-
stitute a case of generalized primary space-like-related modal-correlation
funny business 4 587    SLR    and    &0 
:    &  =  .31
We can test this conjecture just a little by considering another diagram, namely
Figure 4. You can check each pair of space-like related point events with more than
30I note with some surprise that one should not strengthen this definition to say that   and   are
consistent (i.e. to say that some history contains them both). The reason is that any case in which
both   SLR   and   	
    =  is a case of funny business. There are two arguments for this:
(1) There are examples, which I omit. (2) In such a case, by the theorem to be proved, you will also
find a case of some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny business.
31The adjective “primary” is important. When outcomes are distant from initials, then SLR modal
correlation is not enough for funny business, since the correlation can be due to perfectly “ordi-
nary” circumstances such as a “common cause.” In the primary case, however, there is, as we have
suggested in Section 2.3, no “room” for additional causal “influences” from the past.
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Figure 4: A piece of funny business that does not exhibit SLR modal correlation of
the simplest kind.
one primary outcome (i.e., the labeled point events) to see that every combination
of outcomes, one from each, is possible. To appreciate that Figure 4 nevertheless
pictures some funny business, think of the entire infinite chain on the left as one ini-
tial event    , and let 
	 be the other. These two initials look space-like related, and
indeed are so in our defined sense: Each member of    is space-like related to 	 .
What smacks of funny business in Figure 4 is that if you know that each member of
 
 “chose” plus rather than minus, then you know that  	 did not “choose” minus.
Symmetrically, if you know that 	 “chose” minus, then you know that not every
member of    “chose” plus; and all of this in spite of the space-like relatedness of
	 and each member of    . This indeed has the flavor of EPR.32
It is effortless to see that the GP concepts apply to this case. Figure 4 shows
that    has but a single GP outcome, &   ; and it shows that this GP outcome of
 
 is inconsistent with the outcome  2

&  of 	 . Since we verified space-like
32I do not know whether the infinite sequence of choice points defining   does or does not make
“real scientific sense.” It seems to me certain, however, that the ability of BST-92 theory to treat of
such cases cannot reasonably be counted against it.
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relatedness of    and 	 , we have a bona fide case of GP SLR modal-correlation
funny business described in strict BST-92 terms.
Rather than further retail testing of the conjecture that GP SLR modal-correlation
funny business catches all EPR-like phenomena to the extent that the language of
BST-92 makes that possible, I turn to a second approach to funny business. The
proof that the two approaches come to the same thing is offered as evidence of their
individual stability.
4 Some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny business
The second effort at extracting a notion of funny business tries to find inspiration
in the (I should think incontestable) fact that when we look for a token-causal
explanation of why things are one way rather than another, we always look to the
past. Something like this thought lies behind much discussion of Reichenbach’s
“common cause” principle as for example in Szabo and Belnap 1996 or Placek
2000, and also behind the prior choice principle of BST-92 cited in Section 2.1.
4.1 Cause-like locus (simplest kind)
My approach to the second notion of funny business begins with a contrastive
observation: Modal correlation invokes the idea of undividedness between histories
at a point event, whereas the prior choice principle relies for its statement on the
idea of separation. Separation is as important as undividedness, maybe more so.
I suggest that separation is cause-like. Start with the prior choice postulate, which
says that if some history is inconsistent with the beginning-to-be of fi (i.e., if & : fi
=
 ), then there is bound to be a point event  in the past of fi such that & 1 2  	 .
Such an  is the initial of a causa causans, a primary or originating transition that
objectively explains or accounts for the fact that being in the outcome event fi is
possible only at the expense of not being in the history & . The transition from the
event  to the primary propositional outcome of  that is determined by fi (provably
exactly one, call it  2

fi  , will be consistent with fi 33) may properly be taken as
a kind of partial “cause” of fi . That transition    2

fi  keeps fi possible, while
itself being a contingent matter, since if the transition from fi had gone towards & ,
fi would thereafter have been impossible.
Let us therefore permit ourselves to say that  itself is a “cause-like locus” for
fi . That means:  is the initial of a nontrivial primary propositional spread, at
least one outcome of which renders fi impossible and at least one of which leaves
fi possible—at least in the immediate future of  . One may define this cause-like
33In fact when  is in the causal past of  , it is provable that 
      .
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concept without coming out with a theory (or even a syntax) of exactly what causes
what.
 
 is a cause-like locus of the simplest kind for fi with respect to & 4 5879& 1 2
 	
.
Why do I say “cause-like” instead of “causal”? There are three reasons. The
first is merely to avoid premature commitment to a theory of causality.34 The
second and more important reason depends on the observation that this notion of
“cause-like locus” does not include a statement that  lies in the past of fi . We
know of course by the prior choice postulate that at least one cause-like locus for
fi lies in its past. The point is that the prior choice postulate says that something
cause-like lies in the past of fi , but it is no part of the definition of what is said
to lie in the past (namely, a cause-like locus) that in fact it does so. Because of
this analytical separation, it makes sense to inquire of a particular cause-like locus
whether or not it lies in the past. Of course our instincts almost drive us to declare
that whatever is a cause must occur in the past; but the analytical separation en-
shrined in the phrase “cause-like” allows us to appreciate the third reason, which
is critical: Neither the definition of cause-like locus nor the prior choice postulate
commit us to the theory that all cause-like loci for fi lie in the past of fi . And in
fact in numerous EPR-like situations, although (according to the present suggested
analysis) invariably some cause-like locus does lie in the past, some cause-like lo-
cus for fi fails to lie in its past. This makes quick intuitive statements liable to
be misleading. For example, it would seem as if the meaning of the prior choice
principle of BST-92 is that “causes lie in the past,” and the principle is defended
intuitively by the observation that when looking for a token-explanation of why
things are the way they are rather than otherwise, we always look to the past. It is
therefore arresting to learn that the principle only says that there is always at least
one cause-like locus in the past; it does not say that all of them lie there.
This suggests that the existence of a cause-like locus that fails to reside in the
past is itself a plausible account of what is strange about EPR-like phenomena. If
there is a place (in Our World) where a transitional determination is made as to
whether the beginning of some outcome event remains possible on the one hand or
is made impossible on the other, one would expect that place to be in the past.35
So:
34Research proposal for a happy syntax of causation: Construe “causes”—and perhaps “effects” as
well—as transitions in Our World. The role of transitions in understanding causation is emphasized
in Xu 1997.
35The sense of “expect” here is tied to a particular mental set; perhaps it is akin to the special sense
in which one expects that there be no “irrational” or “imaginary” numbers.
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  A history & , an outcome chain fi , and a point event  constitute a case of
some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny business of the simplest kind 4 587 &
1
2

	
, but   fi .
The account needs generalizing, and in two directions. The “cause-like locus”
needs generalizing from a single point event  to the more complex idea of an initial
event
  (a set of point events) and the “outcome event” in question also needs to be
generalized to take account of outcomes of a sort too complex to be represented by
a single outcome chain. Each of these generalizations will bring some subtleties in
their respective trains.
4.2 From   to  as cause-like locus
The need to generalize the “causal locus” from point event  to initial event  
we can see from either of two previous examples. Consider that in Figure 4 &  
is inconsistent with fi3 . In this diagram there is no some-cause-like-locus-not-in-
past funny business of the simplest kind; that is, in essence, because no single point
event except 
	 serves to separate &   from 
	


, and 	 is after all in the past of
fi  . But generalize. Let   =  ,  , . . .  . Observe that you need all of (and only)
 
to separate &   and  	   : & [ &9  	     [     & & 1 2&   ]]. You do not
need 	 : For every history in which fi3 occurs, there is a “splitter” in   that splits
that history from &   . What’s funny is that although   can count as an adequate
“cause-like locus” for fi3 , no part of it falls in the causal past of fi  . So noticing
this fact is one way of seeing something funny about the causal structure exhibited
in Figure 4. As for Figure 3, in order to separate &   from  	   , you do not need

 ; the set   = , ,  also suffices as cause-like locus, even though no part of  
lies in the causal past of fi  .
These examples suggest that the idea of separation, which starts with histories
splitting at point events ( &. 192& ), needs to be generalized, and I have already
done so in one way, having defined &.;1 2  by universal quantification: &.;1 2 
46587 &0;132& for every &   . A further generalization is, however, essential.
One wishes to be able to say that & is separated from  at a set of point events   ,
meaning that which member of   might be needed for separation might depend on
which member of  is to be separated from & . This idea needs to be existential:
 
&0 is separated from  at   , written &.;1   , 46587 & [ &    [    
and &0132& ]]
That is, & is separated from  at   iff for each history &0  there is a point event
in   that splits &  from &0 . Note the alternation of the quantifiers.
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4.3 Relevance of a cause-like locus
Before one can base on these thoughts a rigorously defined more general notion
of cause-like locus and a more general notion of some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past
funny business, one needs to face up to a consideration that comes into play only
after separation-at-  is generalized to separation-at-   . My prose description of this
kind of funny business implicitly relied, in a certain way, on the fact that you need
only   to separate &   from  	   . In what way? If   is too large, it may well
contain loose pieces. The nub is that since & 1   	 is existential on   , separation
is preserved even if a number of irrelevant “junk” point events are added to   . These
“extra” points—the ones that do no work in the separation—could be anywhere
without affecting the truth of & 1   	 . Therefore, one would certainly not have
a reason to issue a judgment of “funny business” just because some of these “extra”
point events failed to lie in the past of fi . So at this point a refinement is needed.
We wish to be able to say that each member of   is relevant to separating & from

	
. That’s not the same as “essential”: I just mean that   is “entirely relevant”
in the sense that each piece of   can be used in the separation. I mean that  [    
 &0 [ &0  	 and & 132&0 ]].36
These considerations lead us to enter the following important definitions, albeit
definitions that are not yet in final form.
 
& is relevantly separated from  at   , written & 1   , 4 587 & 1   and  [ 

 
 &0 [ &0  and & 1
2
&0 ]].
 
  is a cause-like locus for fi with respect to & 45879& 1   	 .
  An initial event   and a history & and an outcome chain fi constitute a case
of some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny business (simple kind) 4 587   is
a cause-like locus for fi with respect to & , but no member of   lies in the
causal past of fi .
From the some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past point of view, we can find funny
business in the example of Figure 3. Set   = 
 ,  . Then   is a cause-like locus
for fi  with respect to &   ( &  1   	   ), but none of   lies in the past of fi  . So
again, and to this limited extent, the stability of the definition is confirmed.
4.4 From   to  as an outcome event
In order to complete generalizing some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny busi-
ness, one needs to see that representing outcome events as outcome chains fi is too
36Such a set is not necessarily “minimal” with respect to separating  from 
  ; it could be that
one of its proper subsets also suffices. It just turns out that relevance matters whereas minimality
does not matter.
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special. Just as I generalized from single-point-event initials  to consistent sets-
of-point-events initials   , so I now generalize from single-outcome-chain outcome
events fi to sets-of-outcome-chains outcome events   . Then it will be possible to
prove the equivalence of the statements that there is funny business in the GP SLR
modal-correlation sense with funny business in the some-cause-like-locus-not-in-
past.
For a simple case in which the more generalized notion of outcome is needed,
consider once more Figure 3. The outcome event   = 
fi , fi  occurs if and
only if both fi9 and fi  occur, which is to say, in &   and in no other history. That
is, using 	  for the occurrence proposition for   , 
	  =  	   :  	


=
&   . Therefore,   does not occur in & . Certainly , is a perfectly good cause-
like locus for   remaining possible at the expense of & ( & 1 2


	  ), and it is
heartwarming to observe that  lies in the past of a member of   ; namely, 
 
fi  ; nothing funny about that. The funny business lies in the fact that   is also
a cause-like locus for   with respect to &0 ( & 1 2   	  ), even though 	 does not
lie in the past of any member of   and so cannot provide a source of “influence”
that travels along a “world line” up from  to a member of   . Funny business
indeed. Note that fi9 alone will not show up the funny business because fi occurs
in & ; nor will attending to fi3 alone help. The reason is that although fi  does not
occur in &  , neither 	 nor  nor even   = 	 , 
 serves as a cause-like locus
for fi  with respect to &  , since   thus defined does not serve to separate &0 from
(every history in)  	


. You need the joint occurrence of fi  and fi  in order to
exhibit some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny business.
4.5 Final account of some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny business
I extract rigorous definitions from these deliberations as follows.
 
  is an outcome event 4 587  is a nonempty set of outcome chains that is
consistent in the sense that    	 : fi     .37
So an outcome event can have disjoint pieces, and to say that it occurs is to
say that each piece begins to be.38
 
 	  is defined as    	 : fi    .
 
 
is a cause-like locus for   with respect to & 45873& 1   	  .
37This definition seems helpful, but there is no reason to believe that it is exclusively so. See note
29.
38The idea of representing certain events as sets of sets is due to von Kutschera 1993, an idea
that is also made use of by Xu 1997. It is obvious that the source of the idea lies in theoretical
considerations rather than “common sense”; those considerations seem to me to be powerful.
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  To say that an initial event   “does not lie in the past of” an outcome event
  is to say something doubly universal: for every     and every fi   , 
 fi (no member of the initial event lies in the past of any member of the
outcome event).
  An initial event   and a history & and an outcome event   constitute a case
of some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny business 4 587   is a cause-like
locus for   with respect to & , but no member of   lies in the causal past of
any member of   .
This is our “final” account of some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny busi-
ness. It might be adequate to all cases of EPR-like funny business to the extent
that they can be represented in the language of BST-92. Evidence in this direction
is provided by the fact, to be proved shortly, that there is a case of some-cause-
like-locus-not-in-past funny business if and only if there is a case of generalized
primary space-like-related modal-correlation funny business.
5 Equivalence of the two ideas of funny business
Let us state again what counts as a case of funny business in each of the two senses.
5-1 DEFINITION. (Two ideas of funny business)
  Two GP propositional spreads        and        together with two
outcome-determining histories &  and & such that     &0 and     & con-
stitute a case of generalized primary space-like-related modal-correlation
funny business 4 587    SLR    and    &0 
:    &  =  .
  An initial event   and a history & and an outcome event   constitute a case
of some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny business 4 587   is a cause-like
locus for   with respect to & , but no member of   lies in the causal past of
any member of   .
We aim to show agreement between the notion of generalized primary SLR
modal-correlation funny business and the some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past ac-
counts of funny business in the following sense.
5-2 THEOREM. (Equivalence of two ideas of funny business) There is a case of
generalized primary space-like-related modal-correlation funny business iff there
is a case of some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny business.
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This is a consequence of the two conditionals Lemma Lemma 5-3 and Lemma
Lemma 5-4. Here is the first half.
5-3 LEMMA. (Left to right) Suppose that   L    L and
 
R  

R together with
outcome-determining histories & L and & R constitute a case of GP SLR modal cor-
relation funny business.39 Then we can find a case of some-cause-like-locus-not-
in-past funny business.
PROOF. The hypothesis gives us that although   L  & L and
 
R  & R, so that

L

& L 
and  R

& R  are each GP propositional outcomes of their respective initial events,
and although also   L SLR
 
R, nevertheless

L

& L 
:

R

& R  =

. We aim to prove
the existence of a case of some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny business. We
can use & L as-is; so we want to use
 
L,
 
R, and & R somehow in order to find an
 
L  
and an   R such that
& L 1

L
 
 	
R

, and 
.fi [(     L   and fi   R)    fi ].
The construction of   R is straightforward: For each  R 
 
R, choose fi R such
that & R : fi R  and  R  fi R and flffi "!#fi R $ =  R, and let   R contain exactly these
outcome chains. It is a well-known fact (see Section 2.3) that such a choice guar-
antees that 	 R

=

2 R

& R  .
The definition of   L   involves a more complicated system of choices. Let & R   

R

& R  . We need to choose a point event to be put into
 
L   that will separate & L
from & R   .
Suppose that   L  & R   . & L  

L & R   would contradict that no history belongs to
both  L

& L  and

R

& R  (recalling that the latter is  	 R
 ), so there must be
an offender in   L at which undividedness fails. Choose one of these  L   , and note
that, since  L    ( & L :3& R   ), not only does undividedness fail, but & L 192 L
 
& R   . Put
 L   into
 
L   . That
 
L SLR
 
R guarantees that  L   won’t be in the past of any member
fi R of   R: If  L    fi R then  L  
 
flffi ( fi R) =  R    R, contradicting the space-like
relatedness of   L and
 
R.
Suppose, however, that   L  & R   ; that is, suppose that for some  L,  L  (
 
L 
& R   ), hence  L  & L  & R   . Then by prior choice there is bound to be an  L   such that
 L    L and & L 1 2 L
 
& R   . Put this  L   into
 
L   . We show that  L    fi R (all fi R   R)
by a reductio; so suppose  L    fi R. Setting  R = flffi "!#fi R $ , it would follow that  L  
 
 R. The identity possibility is ruled out by  L    L together with the space-like
relatedness of   L and
 
R, so (under the hypothesis for reductio)  L    R. Now find
a history & 	 that witnesses the space-like relation between  L and  R. Argue that
& L   2 L
 
& 	 (since  L     L and  L  & L :3& 	 ) and & 	   2 L
 
& R   (since  L    R and  R
39I am picturing the affair in two dimensions, using “L” informally to point to the left wing and
“R” to the right.
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 & 	:3& R   , the latter because  R 
 
R  & R   ), so that & L   2 L
 
& R   by transitivity of
undividedness. Which contradicts & L 132 L
 
& R   and finishes the reductio.
The so-defined   L   evidently splits & L from every required history ( & L 1  L
 

	
R
 ), and the “relevance” condition is also met, because we didn’t put anything
into   L   unless it was good for something ( & L 1

L
 
 	
R
 ). With equal evidence
none of   L   is less than any member of   R. End proof: Each case of GP SLR
modal-correlation funny business implies a case of some-cause-like-locus-not-in-
past funny business.  
5-4 LEMMA. (Right to left) Suppose that there is a case of some-cause-like-locus-
not-in-past funny business. Then there is a case of generalized primary space-like-
related modal-correlation funny business.
PROOF. Suppose that   L, & L , and   R constitute a case of some-cause-like-locus-
not-in-past funny business:40
(a) & L 1  L
 	
R

,
(b)  [     L  & R[ & R   	 R

& & L 132& R]], and
(c) 
.fi [(     L and fi   R)    fi ].
Choose & R such that (d) & R   	 R

. Use the axiom of choice to provide three
choice functions. The first,   , is defined on all sets of histories, and is such that
  (  )   (unless  =  ). The second,   , is defined on all sets   of outcome
chains, and is such that   (   )   (unless   =  ). The third,   , is defined on
all subsets of OW, and is such that   (  )  (unless  =  ). We proceed to
define ordinal-length sequences of initial events, histories, outcome chains, and
point events in such a way as to guarantee that eventually we will reach a stage
exhibiting a GP SLR modal correlation:41
(e)   =  :    .
(f) & 	 = & L . For 0 	 , there are two possibilities. If   L

& L 	:



& R 

,
let &  =   (  L

& L 	:



& R  ). Otherwise, let &  = & L.
(g) fi  =   ( 
fi : fi   R and &  : fi =  )  .
(h)   =   (  :   fi  and &  1 2  	 
   ).
40I am using “R” as associated with the outcome, imagined on the right, and “L” as associated with
the initial, imagined on the left, that is not in its past.
41The circularity of (e)–(h) is only apparent: 


depends on 


and 


; 


depends on 


; 


depends on 


; and 


depends on various  , but only for  .
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We begin by observing that under the hypotheses (a)–(h), the following hold
for any ordinal  .
1. &



L

& L  .
2. &

1

L

	
R

.
3. fi    R and &

: fi

=

.
4. 

 fi

.
5. &  1 2 
  	 
  .
6. & R 
 	



.
7. &

1
2


& R .
8.   L  & L and
 
 & R.
9. If 0 	 then   L SLR
 
.
10. If 0 	 and   L  

L and
 
 


together with outcome-determining his-
tories & L and & R do not constitute a case of GP SLR modal correlation, then
&





& R  .
Items (1)–(10) are straightforward as follows. (1) holds directly by (f). Next
use (1) together with (a) and the transitivity of undividedness to infer (2). This
implies that &  : fi =  for some fi   R, which in turn with (g) implies (3). The
prior choice postulate then implies that  :   fi  and &  1 2  	 
    , so that
(4) and (5) come by the definition (h) of   . The first part of (3) together with (d)
implies (6), which implies (7) when used with (5).
The first part of (8) is a consequence of (b), whereas the second part follows
from (4) and (3) and (d) (histories are closed downward).
For (9), choose  L    L and "   , and show that  L and  are space-like
related. By definition that requires first that they be distinct, which follows from (c)
and (3) and (4). Space-like relatedness also requires that  L and  are consistent
(belong in common to at least one history) and are not causally ordered. It will
suffice to find two histories that split at each of  L and  , for points at which
two histories split must belong to those histories (so that those points must be
consistent), and the points must also be maximal in the intersection of the two
histories (so that neither can lie in the causal past of the other).
We proceed as follows. By (b), choose & R    
	
R
 (and hence (i) & R    
	

 )
such that (j) & L 132 L & R   , and observe that (1) implies that &  

2 L

& L  . Applying
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the transitivity of undividedness to this and (j) gives &  192 L & R   , which is half of
what we want ( &  and & R   will be the required histories). Combining (5) with
(i) implies &  192

& R   , which is the other half, and completes the proof that every
member of   L is space-like related to every member of
  
.
Turning now to (10), assume 0 	 , and that   L    L and
 
 


together
with outcome-determining histories & L and & R do not constitute a case of GP SLR
modal correlation. Observe that by (8) and (9) we have two individually consistent
space-like related initial events   L and
 
such that   L  & L and
 
 & R, so that the
condition of no GP SLR modal-correlation funny business ensures the nonempti-
ness of the set from which (f) makes   pick the history &  , which must therefore
belong to 


& R  , as required by (10).
Finally, take advantage of the fact that Our World is a set; therefore, since
the ordinals outrun any given set, the ordinal-length sequence of   must contain
repetitions. Let
 
be the smallest ordinal such that  =  for some  
 
; hence
 
 
 . Observe that for all  , (7) and (10) taken together imply that     ,
provided that   L  

L and
 
 


together with outcome-determining histories
& L and & R do not constitute a case of GP SLR modal correlation. Since  
 
 , it
must be that   L  

L and
 
  

together with outcome-determining histories
& L and & R constitute a case of GP SLR modal correlation. This completes the
proof that some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny business implies the existence
of generalized primary space-like-related modal-correlation funny business.  
6 Conclusion
The equivalence of the two notions of funny business supports the underlying con-
jecture of this essay, namely, that the theory of BST-92 plus a no-funny-business
postulate gives us a good idealization of a world that is as indeterministic as you
like, and even filled with Bell-like probabilistic correlations, but nevertheless in-
nocent of EPR-like funny business. The conjecture is that the defined ideas of
EPR-like funny business cut at a joint.42
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